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Abstract
Perception is strongly shaped by the actions we perform. According to the theory of event coding, and forward models of motor
control, goal-directed action preparation activates representations of desired effects. These expectations about the precise
stimulus identity of one’s action-outcomes (i.e. identity predictions) are thought to selectively influence perceptual processing
of action-contingent effects. However, the existing evidence for such identity-prediction effects is scarce and mixed. Here, we
developed a new paradigm to capture such effects and examined whether action-outcome predictions can bias the perception
of binocular onset rivalry (Experiments 1a and 1b) and bistable motion (Experiment 2). Participants performed learning tasks in
which they were exposed to action-outcome associations. On test trials, actions were followed by bistable stimuli that could
be perceived as being either congruent or incongruent with the aforementioned associations (i.e. rivalrous oriented gratings in
Experiments 1a and 1b and spheres with ambiguous rotation directions in Experiment 2). Across three experiments, we show
that, whilst exposure to action-effect associations can bias the apparent motion direction of ambiguous spheres, it fails to in-
fluence perceptual selection of grating orientations in binocular onset rivalry. This pattern of results extends previous work on
ambiguous motion by demonstrating that action-induced modulations do not generalize to all types of bistable percepts.
Introduction
Humans are active agents that can intentionally bring about de-
sired effects in the world. This capacity inherently relies on pre-
dictions we make about the consequences of our actions.
Indeed, it has been proposed that we can only behave in a goal-
direct manner because we represent our actions in terms of
their specific sensory effects (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000;
Hommel et al. 2001), and, accordingly, automatically pre-
activate the “identity” of these effects whenever we prepare to
act (Miall and Wolpert 1996). These specific expectations about
the identity of one’s action-outcomes (i.e. identity predictions)
may help us to select the appropriate actions to reach our goals
(Prinz 1997; Elsner and Hommel 2001) but are also thought to
color the subjective perception of our action outcomes (Waszak
et al. 2012). That is, if specific action-outcomes are pre-
activated, actual, prediction-consistent effects, should be selec-
tively affected (e.g. prediction-consistent, but not inconsistent,
effects should have facilitated access to conscious awareness).
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However, as of yet, the existing evidence for such identity-
prediction effects is scarce and mixed. In the present studies,
we tap into this issue and examine whether anticipating a spe-
cific action-outcome can affect the very content of what is con-
sciously perceived.
The view that predicted action-outcomes elicit pre-activation
of sensory representations is typically substantiated by two per-
ceptual phenomena: compared to sensory outcomes with an ex-
ternal origin (e.g. tones, haptic feedback), self-produced sensory
input is perceived as occurring earlier (intentional binding;
Haggard et al. 2002) and as suppressed in perceptual intensity
and neurophysiological activity (sensory attenuation; Schafer
and Marcus 1973). For instance, neural responses during self-
produced speech are smaller compared to when listening to a re-
cording of yourself speaking (Curio et al. 2000).
Importantly, however, these observations typically involve
the comparison between self-produced and externally produced
outcomes, which differ in more ways than the mere availability
of action-outcome predictions. For instance, when preparing to
speak, you do not only have information about what is going to
be said, but also about when you will start speaking. This type
of temporal control and temporal predictability is not present
when listening to a tape or to someone else speaking. As such,
typical intentional binding and sensory attenuation effects can-
not be unequivocally attributed to anticipations about the “con-
tent (or identity)” of action-effects (see Hughes et al. 2013a for a
review). A few studies have attempted to circumvent the afore-
mentioned issue by manipulating the prediction congruency of
self-produced outcomes (e.g. by comparing the perceived inten-
sity of tones that were congruent or incongruent with previ-
ously learned action-tone associations); hence isolating identity
predictions. The results of these studies were, however, mixed
and inconclusive. Specifically, some studies have reported in-
creased sensory attenuation for prediction congruent versus in-
congruent effects (Cardoso-Leite et al. 2010; Desantis et al. 2014;
Hughes et al. 2013b), while other studies did not find (clear) evi-
dence for these effects (Bednark et al. 2015; Hsu et al. 2013;
Dogge et al. in preparation). In contrast, intentional binding
seems unaffected by identity predictions (Bednark et al. 2015;
Desantis et al. 2012; Haering and Kiesel 2014). Taken together,
direct evidence for the influence of action-based identity predic-
tions on the perception of action-outcomes is scarce.
Arguably, a more potent approach for capturing the hypothe-
sized influence of identity-predictions on conscious perception,
is to capitalize on the phenomenon of perceptual bistability.
Bistable images are single stimuli that yield two conflicting per-
ceptual interpretations (identities), one of which can match the
expected perceptual outcome (Leopold and Logothetis 1999;
Blake and Logothetis 2002). Considering that the perceptual con-
flict in such paradigms can be a conflict of stimulus identity,
bistable phenomena are likely to be more susceptible to modula-
tion by action-based predictions compared to intentional bind-
ing and sensory attenuation. A handful of studies has provided
results compatible with this idea (Wohlschla¨ger 2000; Maruya
et al. 2007; Mitsumatsu 2009; Beets et al. 2010; Di Pace and
Saracini 2014; Wallis and Backus 2016). In these studies, self-
movement of participants biased the perceived motion of ambig-
uous stimuli in the direction of the action. Although these re-
sults are promising, and generally explained in terms of the pre-
activation of action-effects, their reliance on these mechanisms
is not unequivocal. In the aforementioned studies participants
viewed the bistable stimuli while moving at the same time. This
is problematic considering that the execution of an action is not
only accompanied by a prediction of upcoming effects, but also
by tactile and proprioceptive feedback. Both these types of infor-
mation are known to bias predominant percepts in favor of the
congruent visual interpretation (Lunghi et al. 2010; Lunghi and
Alais 2013; Salomon et al. 2013). Accordingly, the aforementioned
studies cannot clearly distinguish the effects of outcome-
anticipation from other action-related sources of information
(see Wohlschla¨ger 2000, Experiment 4 for an important excep-
tion). The role of identity prediction processes in conscious per-
ception in general—and in bistable perception specifically—thus
remains to be elucidated.
Across three experiments, we investigated whether action-
outcome anticipation can bias the content of conscious
perception. We did so, by utilizing different forms of bistable
perception. Experiment 1a and 1b examined the influence of
outcome prediction on binocular rivalry; a particular type of
bistable perception in which each eye is presented with a con-
flicting image (e.g. house versus face, or vertical versus horizon-
tal gratings), causing conscious perception to alternate between
the two eyes’ images in periods of exclusive dominance (Blake
2001). The percept that initially becomes dominant during expo-
sure to binocular rivalry stimuli (i.e. onset rivalry; Carter and
Cavanagh 2007; Stanley et al. 2011) is of particular interest, as
action-outcome predictions already emerge as early as the late
stages of motor preparation (Desantis et al. 2014). A focus on on-
set rivalry thus provides a direct test of the proposed mecha-
nisms underlying identity-prediction effects: If action-
preparation results in early pre-activation of specific action-
outcome representations, this specific outcome-identity should
reach the threshold of conscious awareness faster (Waszak et al.
2012), and win the battle for initial dominance.
In Experiment 2, we built upon the few previously mentioned
bistable perception studies involving actions (Wohlschla¨ger 2000;
Maruya et al. 2007; Mitsumatsu 2009; Beets et al. 2010; Di Pace et al.
2014; Wallis and Backus 2016), and employed bistable motion.
Relative to stationary ambiguous stimuli, perception of motion
direction is known to be more susceptible to factors like volun-
tary control (Hugrass and Crewther 2012). In addition, bistable
motion can be modulated by identity predictions, such as expec-
tations based on learned cue-movement associations (Haijiang
et al. 2006; Schmack et al. 2016), and hence seems suitable to pick
up action prediction effects.
To address our research question, we devised a novel learn-
ing task consisting of two types of trials. On induction trials,
participants were exposed to associations between a manual ro-
tary movement and a subsequent unambiguous percept (i.e.
one of two grating orientations in Experiment 1a and 1b, and
one of two motion directions in Experiment 2). On test trials,
this same rotary movement was followed by ambiguous per-
cepts (i.e. different gratings in each eye in Experiment 1a and
1b, and an ambiguously rotating sphere in Experiment 2).
Importantly, the rotary movements were temporally separated
from the bistable percepts allowing us to examine the role of
outcome-anticipation while minimizing influences of other
action-related sources of information. We hypothesized that
participants would be more likely to report percepts that were
consistent with action-outcome anticipations, both when pre-
sented with rivalrous stimuli and ambiguous motion.
Experiment 1a
Methods and materials
The current line of studies was conducted in line with the rec-
ommendations of the ethics board of Social and Behavioral
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Sciences at Utrecht University and all participants provided in-
formed consent prior to participating in the study. Participants
received money and/or course credit in exchange for their
participation.
In all experiments, Bayesian analyses were used to allow for
both the assessment of the evidence in favor of the alternative
hypothesis that action predictions affect conscious perception,
as well as for the null hypothesis that action predictions do not
affect conscious perception (Wagenmakers et al. 2017). Bayesian
analyses were performed in JASP version 0.8.2.0 (JASP Team
2017), using the default Cauchy prior width of 0.707. Sample size
was determined by a pre-specified optional Bayesian stopping
rule: Data collection was terminated as soon as a Bayes factor of
6, favoring either the null or the alternative hypothesis, was ob-
tained (i.e. reflecting substantial evidence; Jeffreys 1961; Lee and
Wagenmakers 2013). However, we decided to collect a mini-
mum of 20 participants (after exclusions based on strong color-
or eye-dominance, or failure to adhere to task instructions - see
data exclusion). Note that, unlike in Frequentist statistics,
Bayesian posterior probabilities and Bayes factors can be recom-
puted and re-evaluated at any point during the data collection
process without error inflation (see Rouder et al., 2014 for a
more detailed explanation). Frequentist statistics are also re-
ported to promote comparison with other studies, but should be
treated with caution due the usage of an optional Bayesian
stopping rule.
Participants
Thirty-two participants (28 females, 1 left-handed, Mage¼ 21.84,
SDage¼ 2.53) took part in the experiment.
Stimuli and apparatus
Participants viewed the stimuli through a mirror stereoscope
consisting of two mirrors at a 45 angle, each reflecting one of
two linearized 23-inch LCD monitors (Dell UZ2315H; resolution:
1920  1080; refresh rate: 60 Hz) that were facing each other (see
Brascamp and Naber 2016 for a more detailed description).
Despite matching the calibration of both displays with the
Spyder3Elite (Datacolor, Lawrenceville, NJ), there were slight
luminance discrepancies between the screens (mean discrep-
ancy was approximately 9%). All reported luminance values are
as measured on the left screen. A chin rest and forehead rest
were used to ensure a stabilized head position at a viewing dis-
tance of approximately 82 cm.
The rivalrous stimuli comprised of circular square-wave
gratings [diameter of 1.48 of visual angle (dva)] that were sur-
rounded by a gray annulus (2.5 Cd/m2, 1.67 dva; thickness: 0.11
dva) with four diagonal rectangular junctures (see Fig. 1). In ad-
dition, a vertical rectangle, which had to be aligned with two of
these junctures (see procedure), was superimposed on the grat-
ing. Both the rectangle as well as the grating were colored gray
on induction trials and red-gray or blue-gray on rivalrous test
trials. To promote stereoscopic fusion of the complementary
images presented to each eye, the stimuli were presented
within identical circular frames of 2.59 dva in diameter (1.1 Cd/
m2), which were in turn encapsulated by a Brownian noise rect-
angle (2.96 dva by 3.33 dva) on a black background (<1 Cd/m2).
All gratings had a spatial frequency of 6.75 cycles per degree,
and a Michelson contrast of 0.2 between minimum (1.6 Cd/m2)
and maximum (2.5 Cd/m2) luminance values.
Procedure and design
The experimental task was framed as a “bridge building game”
in which participants turned vertical gratings into oblique
(tilted) “bridges” by rotating a custom-made cylindrical knob
with their dominant hand. The required rotation direction was
indicated by a visual cue presented to the left or right side of the
grating. Specifically, participants were instructed to rotate the
vertical grating in such a way that an imaginary ball would be
able to roll towards the cue following the line-orientation of the
grating (i.e. a cue on the right side required a leftward rotation);
see Fig. 1.
The task consisted of two types of trials: induction trials and
test trials. In induction trials, rotary movements were immedi-
ately followed by presentation of the corresponding (unambigu-
ous) grating to both eyes. These trials served as exposure to
action-effect associations between rotary movements and obli-
que grating orientations. In test trials the perceptual outcome
following the rotary movement was made ambiguous by pre-
senting each eye with a different 45 or þ45 grating orienta-
tion; one of which was consistent with the preceding
movement. Accordingly, test trials allowed us to examine
whether the action-effect associations that were learned in in-
duction trials biased perceptual selection between rivalrous or-
thogonal gratings. Note that no changes in grating orientation
occurred while the rotary movement was being executed. Once
the movement was completed the vertical gratings immediately
changed to the oblique outcome gratings.
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation point
for a randomly chosen duration of 1000, 1250, 1500, 1750 or 2000
ms. Subsequently, participants viewed a vertical grating with a
movement cue on the left or right side, presented at an eccen-
tricity of 1.05 of visual angle. In response to this cue, partici-
pants were required to execute a clockwise or counterclockwise
manual rotation in order to rotate the grating by 45 towards
the required ending position. In order to help participants to ex-
ecute the proper movement (i.e. rotate the grating to the proper
ending position), four diagonal junctures were shown on the an-
nulus surrounding the grating. The vertical superimposed rect-
angle presented in the center of the grating had to be aligned
with two of these diagonal junctures. In addition, the rotary but-
ton produced a soft but audible click when reaching a rotation
angle of 45. In induction trials, this movement resulted in the
presentation of an action-coherent outcome (500 ms), as well as
textual feedback on the accuracy of the movement (i.e. the
Dutch words for “correct” or “incorrect”; 1000 ms). To motivate
participants to pay attention to the cue position, participants
could earn money with correct rotations and lose money with
incorrect rotations on induction trials. In the test trials a differ-
ent grating was presented to each eye, at corresponding retinal
locations and participants were instructed to verbally report the
color of the first dominant percept and of all subsequent per-
cepts during 5 s. The verbal responses were recorded by a mi-
crophone. Note that by asking participants to report a feature of
the grating that was orthogonal to the feature of interest (i.e.
color instead of orientation), we reduced the likelihood that pre-
diction consistent responses are caused by demand characteris-
tics; see Attarha and Moore (2015) for a similar approach.
Before the experiment participants completed pre-screening
tests to check for color vision (Ishihara 1917), visual acuity (cus-
tomized, digital Landolt-C test) and stereoscopic vision.
Participants did not take part in the experimental phase if they
displayed abnormal color vision, failed to distinguish a gap of
0.07 of visual angle in the Landolt-C task (corresponding to one
line in the gratings) or experienced diplopia. In addition, partici-
pants were screened for eye dominance (i.e. a bias for perceiving
percepts in a particular eye), and color dominance (i.e. a bias for
seeing one of the two grating colors) as both of these biases
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reduce the amount of variance that can be explained by predic-
tion consistency effects. As part of this screening participants
completed 16 trials in which they passively viewed a vertical
grey grating that changed into a colored rivalrous grating (i.e. the
same gratings that were used in the actual experiment). This ri-
valrous grating was presented for five seconds while participants
indicated their dominant percept by means of the “q” and “p”
key on the keyboard (representing red and blue respectively).
Orientation placement (left-eye 45 and right-eye þ45 vs. left-
eye 45 and right-eye þ45), and color placement (left-eye red
and right-eye blue vs. left-eye blue and right-eye red) was ran-
domized over trials. For six of the inclusions, the prevalence of
different factor levels was not perfectly equated due to a pro-
gramming error. As this pre-screening procedure was only used
to assess whether participants were allowed to participate in the
experiment in the first place (with the aim to minimize post-
experiment exclusion), and color and eye dominance were also
assessed during the main experiment, this is unlikely to have af-
fected the reported results. Participants who showed either eye
or color onset-dominance on more than 85% of the trials did not
participate in the experiment (the first four trials were not in-
cluded in this calculation). After successfully completing the
pre-screening participants completed several practice rounds to
become familiar with the rotary button and task-setup.
Induction and test trials were presented in sub-blocks con-
sisting of a sequence of three to six induction trials and one final
test trial. Length of sub-blocks was varied to prevent anticipation
of test trials. The experiment was divided into four blocks that
each contained sixteen sub-blocks. The four possible sub-block
lengths were each presented four times in a randomized order
within each block. This resulted in a total of 288 induction trials
and 64 rivalrous test trials per participant. Cue position (left vs.
right), orientation placement (left-eye 45 and right-eye þ45 vs.
left-eye 45 and right-eye þ45), and color placement (left-eye
red and right-eye blue vs. left-eye blue and right-eye red) were
manipulated within participants. Each combination was shown
two times in each block in a randomized order.
Results
Data exclusion
Despite successfully completing the aforementioned pre-
screening tests, data sets from ten participants had to be ex-
cluded because eye- or color dominance exceeded 85% during
the task. For one participant the task was terminated after two
experimental blocks in which only the red percept reached ini-
tial dominance. The remaining sample consisted of twenty-two
participants (18 females, 1 left-handed, Mage¼ 21.68,
SDage¼ 2.08). In addition, trials were excluded from analysis
when the button was incorrectly handled, such as when it was
rotated too fast (before the presentation of the cue), too slow
(not within the response limit of 2 s), not far enough, back and
forth or more than once; M¼ 0.92%, SD¼ 1.33%). In addition, tri-
als in which the button was rotated in the wrong direction
Figure 1. Schematic representation of trial events in induction and rivalry trials of Experiment 1a. Contrasts and colors deviate from those used
in the experiment for illustrative purposes. Participants were instructed to rotate a vertical grating in such a way that the lines of the grating
were pointing towards the side of a cue (*). In a sequence of three to six induction trials, rotary movements were followed by the presentation
of the same (action-coherent) oblique grating in both eyes, and by feedback on the accuracy of the action [i.e. the Dutch word for correct
(“juist”) or incorrect (“onjuist”)]. In the rivalry trials (outlined in red), each eye was presented with a different grating whose orientation was ei-
ther consistent or inconsistent with the preceding movement. Participants were asked to verbally report the initially dominant percept and all
subsequent switches. Cue position could vary within a sub-block.
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(i.e. not in the direction that was indicated by the movement
cue; M¼ 0.14%, SD¼ 0.46%) and trials in which the first spoken
response after presentation of the rivalry stimulus was some-
thing other than “red” or “blue” were also excluded from analy-
sis (M¼ 0.79%, SD¼ 1.06%).
Perceptual selection
Only the first verbal responses to the rivalry stimuli were con-
sidered in the analyses. The proportion of prediction-consistent
percepts of all participants (see Fig. 2) were submitted to a direc-
tional one-sample t-test against chance (i.e. a proportion of 0.5
prediction-consistent responses). This analysis revealed that
perceptual selection of prediction-consistent percepts (M¼ 0.51,
SD¼ .07) was not likely to be greater than what is expected by
chance (BFþ0¼ 0.59; t(21)¼ 1.02, P¼ 0.16, d¼ 0.22). Instead the
data were 1.7 times more likely to reflect a null effect (no influ-
ence of prediction) than to reflect greater prevalence of
prediction-consistent responses.
Discussion
Experiment 1a did not show convincing evidence for the influ-
ence of action-based predictions on perceptual selection during
onset rivalry. These results have to be interpreted with caution,
considering that the outcome of the Bayesian analysis was in-
conclusive and therefore also failed to provide support for the
null hypothesis. We opted to end the experiment preliminary
(i.e. prior to reaching all of the stopping rule requirements) as se-
quential analysis of the Bayes factor failed to consistently di-
verge to either of the pre-specified, stopping-rule thresholds.
Participant debriefings suggested that a potential reason for the
absence of the prediction effects might be related to suboptimal
task design. Specifically, participants indicated that they used
the position of the cue to determine the correct rotation direc-
tion, rather than the required position of the grating. In other
words, rather than envisioning which oblique orientation would
allow the ball to roll towards the cue, they used an easier stimu-
lus–response strategy (e.g. “if the cue is presented on the left, I
have to rotate to the right”). This strategy clearly reduces the
task relevance of the grating orientation, which might have pre-
vented participants from picking up on the associations between
these stimulus features and preceding actions. Indeed, it has
been shown that the acquisition (and/or retrieval) of action-
effect associations is hampered for non-salient, task-irrelevant
outcomes (Dutzi and Hommel 2009). As expectations about
upcoming action-outcomes cannot be formed in the absence of
these associations, the reduced relevance of grating orientations
might explain the absence of the prediction effects in this study.
In Experiment 1b, we tackled this issue by discouraging par-
ticipants from using aforementioned stimulus–response strate-
gies. Instead of always starting in a vertical position, the grating
could now also be presented in a horizontal position.
Accordingly, the position of the cue itself was no longer suffi-
cient to determine the required rotation direction (i.e. a cue pre-
sented on the left required a rotation to the right for a vertical
grating and a rotation to the left for a horizontal grating). In
comparison to Experiment 1a, this approach promotes visuali-
zation of the action outcome. In addition, we would like to point
out that, in contrast to experiment 1a, each oblique grating
could now result from both a clockwise and a counterclockwise
rotation, which precludes the possibility that potential predic-
tion effects are caused by mere action execution rather than an-
ticipated action-outcomes.
Another design element that might have accounted for the
absence of the predicted effect is the difference between grat-
ings presented in the induction trials and test trials. While par-
ticipants are presented with chromatic gratings in the test
trials, they learn to produce (and presumably predict) gray obli-
que gratings in the induction trials. These predicted perceptual
outcomes in grayscale might not (fully) transfer to chromatic
gratings. There is some evidence that is compatible with this
notion from sensory attenuation research. Specifically, neuro-
physiological suppression has shown to be largest for the
action-outcomes that most closely match predicted outcome
features (Ba¨ß et al. 2008; Heinks-Maldonado et al. 2005). The par-
tial mismatch in the predicted and actual features of the grat-
ings in the present study might therefore have reduced
modulation of onset rivalry by predictions of action outcome. In
Experiment 1b, we reduced this mismatch by utilizing identical
grayscale gratings in the induction and test trials.
On top of the aforementioned adjustments, several other
changes were implemented to further increase the likelihood of
observing prediction effects. Firstly, participants used keys in-
stead of verbal reporting in Experiment 1b. Verbal reports are
significantly slower, which means that participants sometimes
found themselves in the process of verbalizing a percept, while
a switch to another percept already occurred. This possibly
noise-inducing factor is less likely when using key responses.
Secondly, participants reported significant fatigue and loss of
concentration while doing the task. We therefore shortened the
length of the task by showing the rivalrous stimuli for one sec-
ond instead of five seconds (see Carter and Cavanagh 2007 for a
similar approach to measure onset rivalry).
Experiment 1b
Methods and materials
Participants
Thirty participants (23 females, 3 left-handed, Mage¼ 23.17,
SDage¼ 2.88) completed the experiment. None of the partici-
pants participated in Experiment 1a.
Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1a, with a few excep-
tions. Only gray gratings were used. Moreover, feedback text
was replaced by a red or green fixation point (i.e. incorrect ver-
sus correct responses, respectively) to facilitate a focus on the
fixation point throughout the trial. We also sought to reduce
Figure 2. Proportion of prediction-consistent percepts for all partici-
pants in Experiment 1a and 1b. The boxes span the interquartile
range. Red circles represent individual participants. Center lines rep-
resent medians and whiskers extend to data points that are <1.5
times the interquartile range. Dotted line represents chance.
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eye dominance effects by adjusting the contrast of the grating
presented to the non-dominant eye for each participant, so as
to equate perceptual dominance of the two eyes. To do so, two
adaptive, accelerated stochastic approximation staircases
(Kesten 1958) of 40 trials were used in which the contrast of the
dominant eye was held constant (Michelson contrast of 0.2 be-
tween background (9.5 Cd/m2) and minimum/maximum lumi-
nance), while the contrast of the non-dominant eye
(determined by means of a hole-in-the-card task) was adjusted
based on the initially dominant percept (starting at a Michelson
contrast of 0.2 or 0.8). The mean contrast value of the last ten
trials of both staircases was the contrast used for the non-
dominant eye in the main experiment (M¼ 0.27, SD¼ 0.14).
Procedure and design
The procedure was the same as Experiment 1a with a few ex-
ceptions. In order to emphasize the association between the ro-
tation of the knob and the rotation of the gratings, the
instructions were slightly altered. Participants were told the
gratings were visual representations of the knob that had to be
set in the correct position. Specifically, the gratings had to be ro-
tated in such a way that all the lines would point towards a cue
(*) presented slightly above the left or right bottom juncture on
the annulus surrounding the grating (see Fig. 3). In addition, the
starting position of the grating could now be either vertical or
horizontal, the duration of rivalry stimuli was shortened to one
second, and participants reported their dominant percept by
means of a button press. Specifically, participants used the up-
ward or downward arrow key to select one of two vertically
stacked images depicting either a 45 or a þ45 grating.
Vertical rather than horizontal response options were chosen
such as to minimize response bias elicited by the preceding left-
ward or rightward rotary action. In addition, these responses
were executed with the non-dominant hand, whereas the domi-
nant hand was used for rotating the knob.
The aforementioned changes resulted in a design compris-
ing starting position (vertical vs. horizontal), cue position (left
vs. right) and orientation placement (left-eye 45 and right-eye
þ45 vs. left-eye 45 and right-eye þ45) as within subject factors,
and response mapping (top 45 and bottom þ45 versus top þ45
and bottom 45) as a between subject factor. Due to participant
exclusion, response mapping was not equally divided between
groups (13 participants received the first response mapping and
7 participants received the second response mapping). A
Bayesian ANOVA with mapping as a between-subject factor did
not provide conclusive evidence for (nor against) a difference in
prediction consistency between these two groups (BF10¼ 1.16).
However, we would like to stress that there is no reason to as-
sume that one of the response options would lead to more pre-
diction consistent responses. Each combination of within
subject factors was shown two times in each block in a random-
ized order.
Before the experiment participants completed pre-screening
tests to check for stereoscopic vision and eye dominance. Since
a staircase was used to diminish eye dominance effects, partici-
pants were only excluded if they displayed diplopia.
Results
Data exclusion
For eight participants eye dominance exceeded 85% during the
task. The datasets of these participants were excluded from fur-
ther analyses, as motivated in Experiment 1a. The fact that we
had to exclude participants for excessive eye dominance,
despite the use of the staircases, concurs with previous work
demonstrating that equating stimulus strength of rivalry stim-
uli does not necessarily prevents dominance biases in onset ri-
valry (Stanley et al. 2011). In addition, the datasets of two
participants were excluded for failing to keep the head rested in
the chinrest and for consistently executing multiple instead of
one knob rotation, respectively. The remaining sample con-
sisted of twenty participants (15 females, 1 left-handed,
Mage¼ 23.65, SDage¼ 3.18). Trials in which the button was incor-
rectly handled (i.e. rotated too fast, too slow, not far enough,
back and forth or more than once; M¼ 1.88%, SD¼ 2.61%) or ro-
tated in the wrong direction (i.e. not in the direction that was in-
dicated by the movement cue; M¼ 0.39%, SD¼ 0.69%) were also
excluded from analysis.
Perceptual selection
The proportion of initially dominant prediction-consistent per-
cepts was submitted to a directional one-sample t-test against
chance (i.e. a proportion of .50). In contrast to our hypothesis,
this analysis provided substantial evidence “against” the hy-
pothesis that participants are more likely than chance to per-
ceive prediction-consistent percepts (M¼ 0.46, SD¼ 0.14;
BFþ0¼ 0.12; t(19)¼ 1.25, P¼ 0.89, d¼0.28). That is, the ob-
served results were roughly eight times as likely to be observed
under the null hypothesis compared to the alternative hypothe-
sis (see Fig. 2).
Discussion
Onset rivalry was not influenced by exposure to action-effect
associations. Unlike the previous experiment, the Bayesian
analysis now yielded substantial evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis. Even a complete match between gratings on induc-
tion and rivalry trials, as well as more relevance of the grating
orientation was not sufficient to bias perceptual selection.
Together, the combined findings of Experiment 1a and 1b sug-
gest that, at least under the current experimental conditions,
onset rivalry is insensitive to action-based predictions.
Experiment 2
One possible reason for the absence of prediction effects in
Experiment 1 might be that onset rivalry involves competition
that is not, or only weakly, influenced by top-down factors.
Indeed, onset rivalry is very sensitive to bottom-up stimulus
features (e.g. contrast, luminance), and early trait-like influ-
ences such as eye dominance, while the role of top-down pro-
cesses has not yet been extensively examined (Stanley et al.
2011).
In Experiment 2 we attended to this issue by examining
whether action-outcome anticipation can influence perception
of a structure from motion sphere; a bistable percept comprised
of moving dots that can be perceived as a globe rotating in a
leftward or a rightward direction (Andersen and Bradley 1998).
Perception of ambiguous spheres has been shown to be sensi-
tive for modulation from a variety of top-down factors including
beliefs (Schmack et al. 2013; Sterzer et al. 2010), working memory
(Scocchia et al. 2013), associative learning (Schmack et al. 2016)
and voluntary control (Brouwer and Van Ee 2006). By keeping all
other aspects of the task as similar as possible to the previous
experiments, Experiment 2 therefore allows us to examine
whether the influence of action-based predictions can be ob-
served when using a type of bistable perception that is known
to be susceptible to modulation by top-down factors.
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Methods and materials
Participants
Twenty participants (15 females, 2 left-handed, Mage¼ 23,
SDage¼ 2.99) participated in the experiment.
Stimuli and apparatus
Visual stimuli were structure-from-motion spheres (diame-
ter¼ 2.22 dva) consisting of 240 white squared “dots” (0.06 dva;
113 Cd/m2), which each had a fifty percent chance of moving in a
rightward or a leftward direction. In the center, the dots moved
with a speed of 45 degrees/s, which decreased to a speed of zero
near the edges of a circular aperture following a sinusoidal pro-
file, thereby eliciting the percept of a sphere. Dot lifetime was one
second (to avoid that all dots would be replaced simultaneously,
the initial dot “age” was randomly chosen between zero and one
seconds). The rotation direction of the sphere was either unam-
biguous (induction trials) or ambiguous (test trials). Ambiguous
spheres consisted of two identical 2D sphere projections that
were presented to both eyes. Due to the sinusoidal speed profile,
observers tend to see the dots moving in one direction as being in
a different depth plane than the dots moving in the other direc-
tion, causing the percept of a leftward or rightward rotating globe
(depending on whether the leftward or rightward dots are per-
ceived in the front plane respectively). Unambiguous spheres
were created by adding binocular disparity to the dots (i.e. adding
a horizontal offset between the two eyes; maximum offset from
fixation¼ 0.04 dva), inducing a stable depth percept (e.g. by
presenting the leftward moving dots on the near depth plane,
and the rightward moving dots on the far depth plane).
Importantly, the monocular stimulation induced by presentation
of the unambiguous and ambiguous spheres were virtually iden-
tical, while the percept elicited by the unambiguous spheres
could still be reliably manipulated experimentally. All stimuli
were presented on a black background (<1 Cd/m2) and viewed
through the same stereoscope as described for the first two
experiments.
Procedure and design
The experiment consisted of two types of trials: (i) unambiguous
induction trials in which only the prediction-consistent rotation
was presented and (ii) ambiguous test trials in which perception
could be of either the prediction-consistent or prediction-
inconsistent rotation direction. Each trial started with a gray fixa-
tion point (56.2 Cd/m2; 0.13 dva) that was presented for a randomly
chosen duration of 1000, 1250, 1500, 1750 or 2000 ms.
Subsequently, participants observed a stationary 2D sphere with a
fixation point in the center and a red movement cue (23.3 Cd/m2;
0.13 dva) presented left or right of the sphere at an eccentricity of
1.48 of visual angle. Participants were instructed to keep their
gaze fixated on the fixation point and to use a rotary button to ro-
tate the front of the sphere towards the cue (i.e. a cue on the right
side required a leftward rotation). To motivate participants to pay
attention to the cue position, they were told that correct rotations
would be rewarded with a monetary compensation. Similar to the
previous onset rivalry experiments, participants could only earn
Figure 3. Schematic representation of trial events in induction and rivalry trials of Experiment 1b. Contrasts and colors deviate from those used
in the experiment for illustrative purposes. Participants completed sub-blocks consisting of three to six induction trials and one rivalry trial
(outlined in red). Cue position could vary within a sub-block.
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money on the induction trials. This rule was not explicitly men-
tioned in the present experiment to not draw attention to differ-
ences between induction and test trials. After correctly executing
the rotary movement within response time limit (2 s), a rotating
ambiguous or unambiguous sphere was shown for one second.
Participants reported the perceived rotation direction by selecting
one of two vertically stacked images depicting either a leftward or
rightward rotation. Images were selected by means of the upward
or downward arrow key (rather than the leftward or rightward
keys) to minimize bias by the preceding leftward or rightward ro-
tary action (see Fig. 4).
Induction and test trials were presented in the same sub-
blocks as described in experiment 1. Cue position (left vs. right)
was manipulated within participants. On half of the induction
trials (36 trials) and half of the test trials (8 trials) in each block a
target was presented on the left side of the sphere and on the
other half of the trials a target was presented on the right side
of the sphere. The order of the targets was randomized within
each block. Response mapping (upward arrow¼ leftward rota-
tion and downward arrow¼ rightward rotation vs. upward ar-
row¼ rightward rotation and downward arrow¼ leftward
rotation) was counterbalanced between participants.
Before the experimental phase participants were pre-screened
for stereoscopic vision by inducing varying retinal disparity.
Participants who experienced diplopia did not take part in the
experiment.
Results
Data exclusion
One participant showed a remarkably low accuracy level in the
unambiguous induction trials (accuracy¼ 0.62; z-score¼3.68).
Considering that this resulted in significantly reduced exposure
to correct action-effect associations, this participant was ex-
cluded from further analyses. The remaining sample consisted
of nineteen participants (14 females, 2 left-handed, Mage¼ 22.68,
SDage¼ 2.71). Trials in which participants incorrectly handled
the button (i.e. rotated the button too fast, too slow, not far
enough, back and forth or performed more than one rotation;
M¼ 0.58%, SD¼ 1.07%), as well as trials in which participants ro-
tated the button in the wrong direction (i.e. not in the direction
that was required by the movement cue; M¼ 0.82%, SD¼ 1.59%),
were excluded from further analyses.
Perceived motion
The proportion of test trials in which the perceived rotation cor-
responded with learned action-effect associations was calcu-
lated for all participants for both induction and rivalrous trials.
Mean accuracy on induction trials was high (M¼ 96.50%,
SD¼ 4.54%) indicating that the rotation directions of unambigu-
ous spheres were clear and easily distinguishable. Mean propor-
tion of prediction-consistent percepts on rivalrous trials were
submitted to a directional one-sample t-test. This test indicated
that the observed data was more than a million times more
likely under the alternative hypothesis (prediction-consis-
tency> chance), compared to the null hypothesis (prediction-
consistency¼ chance; M¼ 0.59, SD¼ 0.04; BFþ0¼ 1.16*106;
t(18)¼ 9.41, P< 0.001, d¼ 2.16). Including the data set of the ex-
cluded participant in the analysis (see “Data exclusion”) did not
change this pattern of results: BFþ0¼ 1.54 105. Numerically,
every single participant had a higher proportion of prediction-
consistent than prediction-inconsistent responses (see Fig. 5).
Figure 4. Schematic representation of trial events in induction and test trials of Experiment 2. Participants were instructed to rotate the front of
a sphere towards a red dot presented on its left or right side. In induction trials, movements resulted in an unambiguous, action-coherent, ro-
tation. In test trials, participants were presented with ambiguous bistable spheres that could be perceived as rotating in either a leftward or
rightward direction. Participants indicated the perceived rotation direction by selecting the corresponding image with the arrow keys. Cue po-
sition could vary within a sub-block.
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General discussion
Across three studies we demonstrate that while action-
outcome anticipation does not affect perceptual selection dur-
ing onset rivalry, it does modulate the perceived rotation direc-
tion of ambiguous spheres. These latter results are in line with
previous demonstrations of identity prediction effects in sen-
sory attenuation (Cardoso-Leite et al. 2010; Desantis et al. 2014;
Hughes et al. 2013b). Here, we move beyond this work by show-
ing that action-outcome anticipation cannot only modulate per-
ceptual processing (i.e. the perceived “intensity” of stimuli), but
can also affect perceptual content (i.e. the perceived “identity”
of stimuli). Moreover, the observed prediction effect on bistable
motion corroborates previous work showing that actions tend
to bias perceived motion in the direction of movement (Beets
et al. 2010; Di Pace and Saracini 2014; Maruya et al. 2007;
Mitsumatsu 2009; Wallis and Backus 2016; Wohlschla¨ger 2000).
However, in contrast to these previous studies, we separated ex-
pectations about action-outcomes from other action-related in-
formation sources (e.g. proprioception), and, as such, provide
more direct evidence for the proposed role of outcome-
anticipation in perceptual processing (Waszak et al. 2012).
Interestingly, action-identity prediction effects do not ap-
pear to generalize to all types of bistable perception, as no ef-
fects were observed for onset rivalry. These diverging results
raise the question of whether predictive processes might have
been weaker or absent in Experiment 1a and 1b compared to
Experiment 2. We deem this unlikely considering that the expo-
sure to action-effect associations, in terms of number of trials,
was identical across experiments. There are, however, several
other important differences between the experiments that
might explain the divergent effects; the most apparent being
the variation in the type of bistability that was employed. One
possible, albeit speculative, explanation of the results is that
these different levels of bistable perception might reflect differ-
ent levels of visual processing, with varying susceptibility for
top down modulation. Specifically, we propose that (onset) ri-
valry might be resolved at a lower stage of visual processing
than structure-from-motion, which might be less permeable to
top-down influences (see Meng and Tong 2004 for a similar ar-
gument). There are several arguments that can be put forward
in support of this line of reasoning.
With respect to permeability by top-down influences, binoc-
ular rivalry has been shown to be less susceptible to top-down
modulation compared to other forms of bistable competition or
perceptual suppression. For instance, Meng and Tong (2004)
showed a reduced ability of participants to selectively switch
between rivalrous stimuli as opposed to the two possible orien-
tations of a Necker cube. In addition, perception of ambiguous
structure-from-motion spheres is biased towards the concur-
rent content of visual working memory (Scocchia et al. 2013),
whereas perception during binocular onset rivalry is not (Gayet
et al. 2015). Also, only basic visual processing can be applied to
an image that is binocularly suppressed (for reviews, see Lin
and He 2009; Gayet et al. 2014), compared to other forms of per-
ceptual suppression that allow for more elaborate processing of
the suppressed image (Breitmeyer 2014).
In addition, there are at least two ways that rivalry seems
different from structure-from-motion spheres in terms of the
level of visual processing. First, the “perceptual manifestation”
of binocular rivalry differs from that of other forms of bistable
perception, such as structure-from-motion (Brascamp et al.
2018). Specifically, in an ambiguous structure-from-motion
sphere, one of the two percepts is effectively perceptually sup-
pressed (e.g. the leftwards moving percept), but the visual ele-
ments that constitute this percept are nonetheless consciously
accessible (i.e. the dots that make up the sphere). In binocular
rivalry suppression, however, the observer not only fails to see
the suppressed percept of interest (i.e. the grating orientation),
but also lacks conscious access to image-parts that constitute
the suppressed percept, suggesting more complete suppression.
This “deeper” suppression might render rivalry stimuli less ac-
cessible to top-down influences, potentially explaining the lack
of observed prediction effects in Experiment 1a and 1b. In con-
trast, structure-from-motion spheres are more similar to other
forms of bistable perception, like Necker cubes, whose visual el-
ements remain accessible and, are therefore modifiable by fac-
tors such as voluntary attention (e.g. voluntarily attending to
certain ribs of the cube can be used to induce switches;
Kawabata 1986).
Second, there are some indications that rivalry can be re-
solved at very early stages of visual processing, such as V1 (Lee
and Blake 2002) and even at the level of the lateral geniculate
nucleus (Haynes et al. 2005). Whilst rivalry has also been associ-
ated with activity of higher fronto-parietal areas (Sterzer et al.
2009), the extent to which these areas play a role in modulating
interocular competition, or are involved in cognitive processes
that arise after the interocular competition is resolved (e.g. task
demands, or perceptual reports), remains a topic of vehement
debate (Zaretskaya and Narinyan 2014; Giles et al. 2016;
Brascamp et al. 2018). In addition, there is some recent evidence
suggesting that, although frontal-parietal involvement might
sometimes be observed during rivalry, it is not necessary for
perceptual reversals to occur (Brascamp et al. 2015; Zou et al.
2016). These latter findings are in line with our proposal that ri-
valry reflects a relatively low stage of visual competition (al-
though note studies showing modulations of perceptual
switching as a function of parietal-TMS; Carmel et al. 2010;
Zaretskaya et al. 2010).
At first glance, the idea that binocular rivalry occurs too
early in the visual processing hierarchy for top-down modula-
tion by action-outcome anticipation might seem to contradict
recent findings showing that onset rivalry can be biased by mo-
tion predictions (Denison et al. 2011; Attarha and Moore 2015).
In these studies, participants were more likely to select the ri-
valrous grating with an orientation that logically followed the
preceding motion sequence than a grating with a motion-
inconsistent orientation. Although these results might be inter-
preted as evidence for the influence of top-down predictions on
Figure 5. Proportion of prediction-consistent percepts for all partici-
pants in Experiment 2. The box spans the interquartile range. Red
circles represent individual participants. The center line represents
the median and whiskers extend to data points that are <1.5 times
the interquartile range. Dotted line represents chance.
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(early) visual competition, an alternative explanation has been
offered. Specifically, Attarha and Moore (2015) posit that instead
of reflecting high-level predictive influences, these results
might also have resulted from more local, low-level, priming
mechanisms, in which motion-consistent percepts are primed
by synchronized activity between subcortical areas and the vi-
sual cortex. This interpretation is in line with the observation
that both predictions based on semantic context and more com-
plex pattern motion failed to bias onset rivalry (Attarha and
Moore 2015), as well as with our failure to observe an influence
of outcome-predictions on perceptual selection.
Taken together, there is some, although not unequivocal, ev-
idence to support the idea that the difference in findings be-
tween the two present experiments might be the result of
differences in the stages of visual competition that were in-
volved. We like to stress that this notion is speculative, and
point out that the current results and explanation might be re-
stricted to the initial dominance percept of rivalry. Indeed, there
is evidence to suggest that the underlying mechanisms of onset
rivalry and ongoing rivalry might be at least partially indepen-
dent (e.g. Stanley et al. 2011). Additional research comparing
various forms of bistable perception (and binocular rivalry),
with varying depths of suppression, could provide valuable in-
sights into these issues.
There are several alternative explanations, relating to subtle
procedural differences between the experiments that need to be
considered. One of these procedural differences pertains to the
extent of spatial correspondence between hand movements
and grating rotations. In the rivalry studies, the rotation plane
of the knob was perpendicular to the movement of the grating
on the screen. In contrast, in Experiment 2, the sphere rotated
on the same plane as the rotary button. Although previous work
has suggested that spatial correspondence between action and
motion displays facilitates action-based modulation of bistable
perception (Wohlschla¨ger 2000; Experiment 1), these effects
have also been observed in the absence of such correspondence.
Specifically, when action and motion display share a cognitive
dimension, a congruent spatial relation has shown not to be a
prerequisite for the effects (Wohlschla¨ger 2000; Experiment 3).
Considering that such cognitive coupling between hand move-
ments and bistable stimuli was equally induced across studies,
we are confident that action-identity prediction occurred in all
experiments.
Another procedural factor that could be argued to account
for the observed differences between Experiments 1 and 2 is de-
mand characteristics. That is, the results of Experiment 2 might
not be a reflection of outcome prediction effects, but instead re-
flect the propensity of participants to report their explicit expec-
tations concerning what they should perceive instead of their
actual percepts. We assume that such demand characteristics
are especially probable in the absence of a clear sensory signal.
In contrast, if participants are very certain about what they see,
they will tend to rely on (and report) their percepts. If demand
characteristics are fully responsible for the effect we observed
in Experiment 2, the question remains why they would not
have been present in Experiments 1a and 1b. We have reasons
to believe that such demand characteristics were, in fact, more
likely to play a part in Experiments 1a and 1b (in which no effect
of action-prediction was observed). One indicator of perceptual
uncertainty in bistable perception paradigms is the number of
reported mixed percepts, referring to situations in which partic-
ipants do not exclusively perceive one of the competing per-
cepts, but rather a mixture of the two [i.e. parts of each eye’s
stimulus during binocular rivalry (Blake 2001), and two convex
or concave half spheres during ambiguous motion (Hol et al.
2003)]. While participants in our lab regularly report the former,
the perception of mixed sphere percepts is rare. Considering the
absence of prediction effects in the first two experiments, in
which perceptual uncertainty was higher, it is unlikely that de-
mand characteristics can exclusively account for the observed
effects in Experiment 2.
Conclusion
We extend previous work by showing that action-outcome an-
ticipation cannot merely modulate perceptual processing, but
can also bias the actual content of our conscious perception.
Importantly, prediction effects were only observed when ac-
tions were followed by bistable motion, but not by rivalrous
gratings. The present results coincide with previous work sug-
gesting that binocular rivalry in general, and onset rivalry in
particular, might be less susceptible to top-down influences.
This discrepancy might point towards differences in underlying
mechanisms. Further examination of the commonalities and
discrepancies between distinct forms of bistable perception, as
well as the possible restrictions to the influence of top-down
biases, will provide important insights in the role of predictive
processing on awareness.
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